Transformations in
African Agriculture: natural resources, livelihoods and markets
Report on ESRC Research Seminar, 2000-2002
R45126498499
Award holder:
Dr. Simon Batterbury,
Then: DESTIN,
Now: SAGES,
simonpjb@unimelb.edu.au
22/07/2002
archived at www.simonbatterbury.net
Rationale for the seminars
The purpose of these workshops was to bring together
academics, policymakers, and other interested parties to discuss current trends
– and future opportunities – in
A particular aim was to engage the British overseas aid
agency, DfID, in discussions with scholars in
Meetings held (see annexes
for meeting reports and participant lists)
The first workshop entitled ‘Politics
of Land Reform in the ‘New’ South Africa’ was held in June 2000, jointly convened by Simon Batterbury and Gavin
Capps (DESTIN, LSE) and brought together 50 scholars and land activists from
Europe and South Africa, to debate the implications of recent changes in South
Africa’s land reform programme, with an eye to recent events in Zimbabwe. Key
papers were circulated and delivered by Ben Cousins (University of the Western
Cape) and Gavin Williams (Oxford), and other comments were received from the
participants (see comment by Abie Ditlhake in the annex). Co-funding of £500 was applied for and received from
STICERD, LSE to assist with travel costs from
The second was held on
The third
workshop, ‘Access to Resources: Land Tenure and Governance in Africa’ was led by
Phil Woodhouse of the Institute for Development Policy & Management,
The fourth workshop was held at the University of Lund, Sweden and
pursued an ecological theme. It was entitled the ‘The recovery of vegetation in the
A
fifth meeting, for which funds were not claimed on this grant, again because of
the late date, returned to the ‘governance’ theme. ‘Changing scales of governance and their local impacts – tracing the
links’ was held as a special session of the Association of American
Geographers meetings in
A website was set up in 2000 to hold the main findings
of the workshops, at www.lse.ac.uk/depts/destin/simon/transformations.htm. (now closed)
Constraints
Despite cost-sharing and a small amount of co-funding, funds from this
grant could only stretch to fully funding four workshops. As per the grant proposal,
the entire budget was spent on organizational costs, travel, and accommodation.
The first three seminars in particular were large, ambitious, and costly.
The participation of DFID,
In August 2001 the organiser and grant holder, Simon Batterbury,
completed a two year lectureship at the LSE. He retains part-time and paid work
at the LSE, and was made visiting research fellow until 2004 by the LSE
Director, Anthony Giddens. However he now spends most of the academic year at
the
1. How have
changes in the recent political economy of sub-Saharan
2. What lessons
can be learned about the exploitation of high value-added crops in ways that
benefit producers, not just intermediaries and retailers in the distribution
chain? What difference, therefore, can producer co-operatives and fair-trade
organisations make?
3. How do these
alternative organisations work, and how may they best be supported?
This seminar would have extended the claim by Woodhouse,
Bernstein et al on the universality
of commoditisation processes, but would have examined the extent to which the
alternative agricultural sector offers possibilities to instigate different,
more advantageous labour and capital relations.
Conclusion
Deliberative,
multi-disciplinary and focussed seminars that involve policymakers and
researchers, can help provide clearer messages to take forward into future
research and policymaking. Funding for this series of workshops successfully raised awareness of
several key issues facing African agriculture.
ANNEX:
WORKSHOP REPORTS
|
‘Politics of Land Reform in the ‘New’ held at the London School of
Economics (LSE) on Organised by Gavin Capps and Simon Batterbury |
This workshop was hosted by the Development Studies Institute, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, as a discrete session within a broader seminar series on ‘Transformations in African Agriculture: Natural Resources, Livelihoods and Markets’. Its purpose was to explore the wider (national and regional) politics behind recent shifts in land reform policy in South Africa and to provide a forum for land analysts and activists, with South and Southern African connections, to make sense of, and respond to, those changes.
A full outline of the background, aims and objectives and structure of the workshop has been included below, along with discussion notes, a workshop report, and an independent view of the issues.
Participants
Ainslie, Andrew Range and Forage Institute, Agricultural Research
Council andrewainslie@hotmail.com;
Simon Batterbury, LSE,
Prof. William Beinart, University of Oxford, william.beinart@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk;
Teddy Brett, LSE, e.a.brett@lse.ac.uk;
Gavin Capps, , LSE, g.j.capps@lse.ac.uk;
Prof. Lionel Cliffe, Leeds University, pol6lrc@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk,
Prof. Ben Cousins, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, bcousins@uwc.ac.uk,
Abie Ditlhake, South African National NGO Coalition abie@sangoco.org.za;
Prof. Ben Fine, SOAS, bf@soas.ac.uk;
Liz Francis, LSE, e.m.francis@lse.ac.uk;
Ruth Hall, Centre for Rural Legal Studies (Stellenbosch), ruth@crls.org.za;
Zakes Hlatshwayo, National Land Committee (Braamfontein) zakes@nlc.co.za;
Susie Jacobs, Manchester Metropolitan University, s.jacobs@mmu.ac.uk;
Deborah James, , LSE, d.a.james@lse.ac.uk ;
Gareth Jones, LSE, g.a.jones@lse.ac.uk ;
Wayne Jordaan, Transvaal Rural Action Committee and NLC, trac@wn.apc.org ;
Moses Jumo, Environment and Development Agency edahrdp@wn.apc.org;
Rosalie Kingwill, Border Rural Committee (Eastern Cape) rak@intekom.co.za ;
Najma Mohamed, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, nmohamed@uwc.ac.za;
Prof. Colin Murray, Manchester University, msrsscm@fs1.ec.man.ac.uk;
Debbie Newton, Former Free State DLA, newtondebbie@hotmail.com;
Robert van Niekerk, Oxford University, robert.vanniekerk@applied-social-studies-oxford.ac.uk;
Lungisile Ntsebeza, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, lungisile.ntsebeza@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk;
Zolile Ntshona, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, zntshona@iafrica.com;
Prof. Bridget O’Laughlin, Institute of Social Studies, olaughli@iss.nl;
Palmer, Robin, Oxfam, rpalmer@oxfam.org;
Potts, Debbie, SOAS, dp6@soas.ac.uk;
James Putzel, LSE, j.putzel@lse.ac.uk;
Ian Scoones, IDS, i.scoones@ids.ac.uk;
Dan Taylor, Find Your Feet, London /UCL, fyf@gn.apc.org;
Gavin Williams, University of
Oxford gavin.williams@st-peters.oxford.ac.uk;
Prof. Ben Wisner, Oberlin College, USA bwisner@igc.org;
Phil Woodhouse, Manchester University mzdpjw@mail1.mcc.ac.uk;
Rachel Wrangham, r.p.wrangham@lse.ac.uk;
Ingrid Yngstrom, Oxford University, ingrid.yngstrom@lineone.net
|
Three documents follow below: 1) Discussion notes prepared
by Gavin Capps, 2) Workshop report, prepared by Simon Batterbury, July 2000. 3) Remarks by Abie Ditlhake, Director of the South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO) |
1) Outline of Workshop and Discussion Notes
Gavin Capps
Background
The election of
The track record of
This shift in land policy occurred in the
context of the state’s increasingly conservative macroeconomic policy stance,
the apparent downplaying of its social welfare goals, and the alleged
centralisation of political power around its ruling elite. Fundamental and
difficult questions are were posed in 2000 about the future direction of land
policy formation in
Aims
The workshop aimed to generate debate over
the extent and significance of recent changes in South African land reform
policy, with particular reference to the wider politics of land policy
formation in
grasp the political determinants of recent changes in South African land policy, through an analysis of the diverse coalitions who opposed previous policy directions - inside and outside of government - which necessarily raises questions about the character and balance of power in the new dispensation, and of the nature of the ‘transition’ itself
enable activists, advisors and analysts involved in land reform policy in South Africa (previously and currently) to take stock of these changes, share their experiences and discuss possible responses to the new policy environment;
bring in comparative perspectives from the Southern African region and more widely, which are relevant to these aims and objectives.
Discussion Notes
This short set of notes suggests a range of
issues for consideration at the workshop and signals some of the connections
between them. It does not aim to be a complete statement of the current
condition of land reform in
In the context of the problems currently facing land reform in South Africa, and the changes seemingly underway in the policy arena, it seems that there are at least four sets of inter-related issues that we need to consider, each of which relates to different ways of thinking about ‘development policy’ itself. These are:
1. The ‘technical’ issue of institutional
capacity and inertia. A whole series
of commissioned studies and reports have pointed to the fact that
2. The ‘policy as process’ issue of technocratic, top-down policy making coming up against messy and contradictory social realities. Much policy planning is compromised by, on the one hand, political pressures for quick, quantifiable results; and, on the other, social forces and processes which resist, subvert or even co-opt poorly conceived and under-resourced interventions for their own ends. This is as true of black ‘commercial farmers’ being best placed to take the lion’s share of new rural development packages, as it is of ‘traditional authorities’ who have been able to strengthen their local powers through the tenure reform process, or of white farmers reaping new subsidies to labour via housing grants, etc. There is also limited emphasis on building the rural political organisation and capacity to ensure that new legislative rights ‘are made real’ in practice. Policy itself is thus often undermined by the very terms on which it is understood and conducted.
3. The issue of ‘wider politics’, which both links and goes beyond points 1 and 2, by connecting shifts in land policy to broader changes in the balance of power within the state and in the South African political economy as a whole. This issue has four related elements. First, there is the distinct rightward shift within the ANC leadership, that has accelerated throughout the process of the ‘transition’ and culminated in a deeply conservative macro-economic policy stance. The result is a closing down of the spaces that were opened up by the varied social movements that propelled the ANC to power, as the pro-market position is replicated in all policy areas, including land reform. The powerful influence of the World Bank over South African land reform policy has been notable from the onset and the recent, senior personnel changes at the DLA may well reflect a hardening of this trend.
Second, there is the related issue of the varied points of resistance to redistributionist and pro-poor land reform policy. These emanate both from sections of the state and various blocs of economic and political power, such as white farmers, ‘traditional leaders’ and the huge industrial concerns that are linked to, and interested in, maintaining existing patterns of agri-business under conditions of ‘liberalisation’. Coalitions between these interest groups, whether ad hoc or organised, not only shape the outcomes of land reform policy on the ground, but also decisively influence the state, thus setting the parameters within which land policy is formulated and conducted. It would appear that the influence of these lobbies over the current government has become stronger (or at least more open) in recent years, casting doubts on whether the ‘political will’ exists to meaningfully transform the existing pattern of agrarian relations.
Third, there is the question of popular support for land reform and its expression in social movements, which have the potential to pressure the state for change and to ensure that new opportunities from above are realised and defended from below. It is notable that there has been a tailing off of ‘civil society’ activism in rural and urban areas since 1994, although an alliance of land based NGOs has been seeking to counter this trend by organizing rural people and their demands through the Rural Development Initiative. What impact this type of ‘rural centred’ mobilisation, as well as other forms of action, such as land occupations, can have on policy formation is posed all the more sharply by unfolding events in Zimbabwe, which are themselves, of course, much bigger than the land question alone.
Finally, there is the difficult question of
the ways in which ‘race’ has become central to the politics of policy making in
4. The issue of the role of ‘progressive’ land policy advisors and activists. With the official narrowing of the ‘desirable’ and the ‘possible’ in land policy, difficult decisions are now being confronted by policy advisors and activists who previously sought to be involved in, or influence, the land reform programme. In many ways, the current marginalisation of such people by the DLA reflects the experience of the ‘progressive economists’, whose work was increasingly side-lined in favour of neo-liberal orthodoxy as the ANC came closer to power. Thus, as with the ‘progressive economists’, academics and activists concerned with South Africa’s intractably complex land question may have to think more strategically about their relationship to the state and to social movements outside of it, both of which seems to be offering fewer opportunities for promoting radical change at present. The question of ‘which way forward’ is thus a pertinent one that can only be answered effectively with a shared and objective assessment of the changing terrain on which it is being posed.
(These
were discussion notes were prepared by Gavin Capps,
2)
The Politics of Land Reform in the "New"
Report
of a workshop, LSE,
Simon Batterbury, DESTIN, LSE.
[Speaker's initials given in text - they refer to list above]
Post-apartheid
1) restitution of land to
people dispossessed by apartheid,
2) land tenure reform, and
3) land redistribution to the poor
Yet the path to land reform
(*) has been far from smooth; the process of restitution has proceeded too
slowly; land reform has recently seen significant and disturbing changes of
emphasis; and redistribution is mired in controversy. Arguably a policy vacuum
now exists in the light of new legislation announced by the new Minister in
February 2000. A meeting held in
Gavin Williams (paper available from author above) outlined the complex institutional changes that have occurred since the ANC came to power in 1994. He contrasted the relative speed at which the NDA (National Department of Agriculture) has gone about liberalizing agricultural markets since 1994 (through subsidies terminated in the late 1980s, the end of government agriculture boards, and leaving commercial farmers to float in marketplace), with the substantial delays and derailments that have affected the DLA (Department for Land Affairs) responsible for land reform and redistribution. The adoption of a neoliberal macro-economic policy, GEAR (Growth Employment and Distribution) by the ANC soon placed the focus on RSA’s agricultural sector on market led growth rather than redistribution to dispossessed farmers. This trend has been cemented with the merger of the DLA and NDS in 1996 and, importantly, the replacement of Derek Hanekom by Thoko Didiza as Minister for Agriculture in 2000. Didiza’s statements since taking office indicate a strong concern to push commercial agriculture, and the needs of the emergent black commercial farmers, over the calls for land rights for the rural poor. A draft Land Rights Bill has been suspended pending revisions, and this move has been greeted with resignation by its authors and supporters, but with seeming indifference by the DLA management. Williams argued that one vision of modernity in the whole 'actor network’ of land reform players was rapidly replacing another, with market liberalization and privatization currently much higher on the agenda than the former egalitarian commitments to redistributing resources.
Several new initiatives for land reform and the restitution of land to black farmers date from the early 1990s, but by the mid 1990s the World Bank’s proposals to promote commercial agriculture had watered down the welfare objective of land reform as supported by progressive NGOs like the NLC (National Land Commission). The ANC's Reconstruction and Development Plan called for the transfer of 30% of the medium to high-quality white-owned farms to 600,000 people, but this proved an unrealistic hope, and the policy was soon abandoned. The DLA programme attempted to implement redistribution to the poor, by means of Settlement /Land Acquisition Grants of R15000 (£1500) for those falling under an earnings ceiling. Land Reform Pilot Projects went ahead in the 9 provinces since 1994, employing a variety of mechanisms, each with different implementation procedures and personnel. In terms of Land Tenure reform, a major thrust has been to recognize de-facto rights to land, through the formation of Community Trusts and Communal Property Associations. These have been open to abuse by traditional authorities and entrepreneurs, however.
By the early 1999 some 35,000 households had acquired rural land in the former white areas by means of government subsidies. The government has introduced tenure reform primarily on privately held land. Land tenure reform in the communal areas of RSA has lagged behind, partly because of poor administrative capacities and legal/operational confusions. Grants offered are too small for new farmers to make a livelihood in the absence of other income generating opportunities. There is currently (late 2000) a review of the DLA ongoing that recommends a supply-side approach to land allocation, falling back on local authorities to manage the process. This official review would like to see more overall support to medium and some black commercial farmers. Alongside this, grants and payments to new land holders have been restructured. It is envisaged that groups or tribes will now purchase land, using the grant system, and then subdividing blocks for sale to families. Farmers with demonstrable commercial experience will get more assistance, up to R100,000 (£10,000). Williams concluded that these new measures are actually old ones, replicating methods that have tried and failed elsewhere to distinguish between larger commercial and smaller scale, less commercial black farmers.
100 paces back, one step forward?
To some extent the problems and vigorous discussions occurring around property rights and land access in RSA are not unusual; these debates have always preceded major land reforms elsewhere (JP). But with a substantial bureaucracy associated with land issues, some inherited from the apartheid regime, change has been particularly difficult to implement. CM felt that the political regime has actually retreated from aiding the rural poor over the last few decades.
What have been the drivers of change?
1) Williams’ point that the World Bank models have driven the adoption of commercial and market led models of reform, did ring true for some, but it is still the case that as late as the 1980s there was not real discussion of land reform in the Bank, and the models subsequently proposed for RSA by Klaus Deninger, Hans Binswanger and others were at least responsible for a change in policy and the recognition that reforms could usher in greater commercial success in some sectors, by supporting both black and white commercial farmers. The problem again was that the rural poor were marginalised in the mid 1990s WB model and the budget to support them remains small (CM).
2) Several felt that GEAR is the real driver of past and present change in land policy (AD). But 2 caveats; the political left in RSA has yet to develop a really workable set of alternatives that will ensure a modicum of commercial growth coupled to equitable land transfers and reform (GW). Here, BC reminded the meeting of the need to construct such alternatives, actively, possibly through a 'rights-based’ approach to land ownership (**). Secondly as BF pointed out, there is nothing in GEAR as presently formulated, despite its neo-liberal discourse, that would prevent a more progressive land reform happening- macroeconomic policy cannot be blamed in this instance. Indeed the MERG (Macro Economic Research Group) document prepared in 1993 was trying to bolster the 'institutional capacity to deliver’ land reform under the present economic structure, and this could have held out real ways forward (until it was rejected). But AD felt presently, it is unlikely that the economic growth that GEAR promises will support the entire financial burden of wholesale land reform including restitution on white farms and widespread distribution for farming and housing. GC added that under GEAR, the urban labor force is largely demobilized as capital has shifted - leading to further pressures for rural land access.
3) Rather we need to see
that a particular coalition of forces was responsible for the changes witnessed
in land policy after 1994, with 'popular participation’ in decision making now
slimmed back considerably and present directives and decision making at the
national level being, unfortunately, mired in secrecy. Partly this has been
driven by the fear that 'land reform may spiral out of control’ (BF), although
4) Thus land reform, perhaps challenging Gavin William’s analysis further, does not follow entirely its own policy discourse but is imbricated with state, financial, and regional concerns (of which the most important at present is land seizures on white farms in Zimbabwe). The key question to understand is "Who is pressing for land reform?". If this is asked and understood first, effective responses can be targeted better, and alternative policies then formulated. In the discussion of how to respond to the recent disappointing announcements that land will be vested in 'tribal authorities’ rather than restituted to communities or individual black smallholders for houses/farms, we must recognize the vital importance of local or provincial level organs of the DLA and other non governmental groups, who are on the ground trying to implement policies in a situation of uncertainty and fast-changing legislation. Reform and greater capacity is needed at this level too, under the onslaught of claims for land in order to mine the minerals underneath it, and so-on (Bo’L). And de-facto policy is made and interpreted at this level.
5) Institutional capacity and performance will always be a limiting factor in promoting land reform in RSA. We should see that there are significant institutional continuities with the past (AD). We should not see the present policy as any sort of break from the past; neither the present, nor the latter-day apartheid policy really seriously envisaged a radical redistribution of land to the majority of the population. Presently impediments - financial and bureaucratic - disable any widespread land reform. This view was echoed by BO’L, who questioned whether conflicts of personality that have clearly driven some of the recent national level maneuvers and changes really constitute 'policy breaks’ or disjunctures and whether they should be analyzed as 'command driven’ at all. Rather, as AD noted, we see policies as shaped by politics in which opposition politics - not just the politics of those in power (who BC labelled as a black middle class and a bourgeoisie group) - has had an influence. Personality clashes are only one visible facet of power dynamics, but may not be directly related to them.
6) DN, who has experienced
local level implementation of DLA policy in the Eastern Cape, echoed AD in
suggesting local government in RSA lacks the capacity, the infrastructure and
the expertise to implement a complex set of land measures; to deal with claims,
to adjudicate, and to orchestrate land transfers when agreed. She went as far
as to say that in her experience, local government is 'non viable’ at present,
dominated by a class of insecure politicians trying to assist poorly trained
potential farmers (some of whom want land primarily for housing, rather than
agricultural production). BC echoed this - he noted that under the present
regime, almost no land transfers had actually occurred in
7) Our conclusion from this first session was that we may need to look to civil society in its multiple forms to provide a credible set of goals and policies to occupy the policy vacuum and to press for sustained land reform in the absence of strong central direction from the government at the present time. In so doing, NGOs and other actors needed to exploit opportunities in the media (since denationalization of broadcasting?) to promote equitable and rights based approach to land reform (ZH).
Elements of this agenda:-
- rural people need other things than land per se. [see also seminar three in this series]. They need the components of livelihoods - jobs, finance, infrastructure, housing, and healthcare (DN). Land reform or even the DLA, will not provide all of this.
The chieftaincy should not be allowed to dominate the present land reform system. Need organized campaigns and new coalitions to fight the 'restitution to tribal authorities’ policy, if this leads to elite capture of the benefits of land restitution and redistribution.
Selling off land in former
land reform needs to be swiftly enacted with less prevarication and changes of direction (JP). A lesson from other counties is that slow land reform is always ineffective.
given its enormous financial cost,
we need to think of land reform as having goals that lie partially outside
the market (BW). Common property resource management regimes provide people
with security and resilience to environmental or political-economic shocks, and
these cannot be equated with opportunities for substantial financial gain.
There is a disjuncture with rest of
devolution of powers over land ‘all the way downwards’ is not necessarily a great thing in RSA since local level capacity does not yet exist to manage it adequately. [see also seminar three in this series].
Politics of land reform
Ben Cousins (University of
the
Political interests in the state include The Presidency and Cabinet, Government Departments; old white bureaucrats and new black bureaucrats; provincial government and local government bodies. In society at large, there are differentiated rural communities, constituencies of farm workers who often live on private farms, a set of emerging black entrepreneurs, white commercial farmers, traditional leaders, and a variety of corporate capitalist interests and foreign investors. There are linkages between many organisations in society at large - eg between the NLC and NAFU.
Actor networks formed since 1990 have included the NLC (National Land Commission), the ANC’s Land Commission (LAPC) which was itself advised by the World Bank, and university economists. The conjunction of these three bodies led to the formulation of the RDP and land reform policy. Implementation initially fell to the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and Derek Hanekom, but under van Niekerk in the Department of Agriculture, Government policy has essentially fallen into three policy arms
rights based legislation and programmes
Market assisted redistribution via the 16,000 R grants referred to above
deregulation of agriculture and the promotion of small scale farming.
NGO pressure throughout the 1990s has been to resist property clauses in new legislation (thus supporting those without property), to assert 'rights’ based land reform, and to assist in implementation of the new legislation as affiliates of government bodies.
Cousins’ framework for understanding the outcome of three different policy discourses was as follows:
|
Criteria |
Policy Discourses |
||
|
EQUITY |
"State led but community based" - challenge inherited framework of property rights - popular participation - attack gender bias in land allocation |
"Combine state, markets, community and rights" - rights for dispossessed and vulnerable - justice and redress through restitution and redistribution - target 'communities’ and the poor |
"Market-led but state assisted" - deracialise agriculture - remove discriminatory legislation and by affirmative action |
|
EFFICIENCY |
Enhance
value of multiple rural livelihoods through expanded land-base and support |
R16,0000 grant for land aquisition via the market/business plans and CPAs Developmental restitution of land Enhance agricultural production at a variety of scales Create a lean but efficient state (outsourcing) |
Subsidies/grants/support services for emerging black farmers. Promote efficient operation of markets through deregulation. Attract foreign investment. Target rural development in high-potential zones (SDI’s) |
|
IDENTITY |
Land - ----- tradition ---- African leadership |
||
Policy shifts in 1999-2000 have resulted in some elements of this wider South African discourse proving more powerful than others.
In 1999 and 2000, the terms of debate and the direction of policy have shifted markedly, with new directives and personnel.
· From the NGO side, there has been criticism that the projected restitution of land has been too slow, that redistribution has been badly planned, that there is a lack of political will behind these measures, and that there is a gender bias against women in the way land reform has been handled.
· From both internal critics in the DLA and in the Department of Agriculture, came the criticism that the DLA leadership was too ‘white’ and potentially racist. Groups like CONTRALESA, SSAV/Agrisa, and some Provincial politicians were partially responsible for making the call that emerging commercial farmers have been neglected, traditional leaders undermined, and implementation of reform was too centralised.
It was the combination of these two critical thrusts that swept Didiza into office in 1999. Her response has been to
Design a ‘black commercial farmers programme’
To declare an intention to ‘transfer lands to tribes’, where customary law will apply
To go about restitution using cash payouts
to support black leadership in government Departments
to initiate, in Sept 2000, an integrated rural development programme, possibly with links to the FAO, and with unknown operational components.
Given the critiques
launched against the DLA in 1999, one can begin to see how these policies have
found favour in some quarters (not with the majority at the workshop, largely
because of the potential loss of the redistribution agenda for the millions
living in former
What to do?
The meeting unified people who feel that the process of policy change on land reform in South Africa has been ineffective, and that ‘just’ and ‘morally right’ redistribution of land has effectively been sidelined because it is perceived as too controversial and difficult. We did not successfully identify where organised political pressure for change on land reform could come from, and how linkages/coalitions could be forged. We also were a little unclear about the role of academics in this process. Is their role to come up with better ‘plans’ for the state to imlement, or should we be skeptical about the state’s desire to listen to such ideas in the absence of any real political pressure from below to back them up?
The way forward, we believe, lies in
Facilitating the self-organizing capacities of rural interests – to improve their ability to lobby and to stake claims that are more powerful than those that are currently circulating. This may best be achieved by pilot projects…
Wider alliances must be forged, for example with trade unions and sympathetic state officials, to re-consider the current tenure reform.
for Liz Francis, we need to develop an alternative ‘discourse’ – but also to understand budgetary constraints and the management of money, therefore remaining realist.
pushing a livelihoods approach, that reminds the powers that be that land is just one component in complex and overlapping livelihood systems, and it is therefore hard to expect a) all farmers to become commercially successful, or 2) that land will always be cared for and productive. Land is used to support livelihoods; not to support established commercial interests.
understand and support the work of farm workers.
RH identified that PLASS and NLC has already initiated a campaign voicing concern about present policies. There will be written submission to government on these issues, plus an open letter to all Ministers. Alliances are being forged, for example with SANGOCO (South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition). A policy summit on these critical concerns will appear at the end of 2000.
Postscript, 2002.
Since the workshop was
held, there has been increasing pressure on the ANC from organisations like the
NLC, to move from ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ and to exercise its
‘expropriation clause’ in order to speed up land redistribution on white-owned
farms, particularly following the Zimbabwe land crisis. See The Namibian, July
5, 2000 : Business Day, 3 Aug 2000 ‘Land Reform in Trouble’, 'ANC explores Land
Expropriation’ (Business Day, 15th July 2000). In March 2001, the
National Land Committee attacked Land and Agriculture Minister Thoko
Didiza's about-turn on the first major case - the expropriation of a
white-owned farm near
See also Zimmerman FJ.
2000. Barriers to Participation of the Poor in
Footnotes
*What is land tenure reform?
"Land tenure may be defined as the
terms and conditions on which land is held, used and transacted. Land tenure
reform refers to a planned change in the terms and conditions (e.g. the
adjustment of the terms of contracts between land owners and tenants, or the
conversion of more informal tenancy into formal property rights). A fundamental
goal is to enhance and to secure people’s land rights. This may be necessary to
avoid arbitrary evictions and landlessness; it may also be essential if rights
holders are to invest in the land and to use it sustainably. In
**Rights based approach includes
"..rights to occupy a homestead, to use land for annual and perennial
crops, to make permanent improvements, to bury the dead, and to have access for
gathering fuel, poles, wild fruit, thatching grass, minerals, etc.; rights to
transact, give, mortgage, lease, rent and bequeath areas of exclusive use;
rights to exclude others from the above-listed rights, at community and/or
individual levels; and linked to the above, rights to enforcement of legal and
administrative provisions in order to protect the rights holder." Martin Adams, Sipho Sibanda and
Stephen Turner (1999) Land Tenure Reform and Rural Livelihoods in
3) Remarks prepared for the meeting.
Abie Ditlhake abie@sangoco.org.za
Director of the South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO)
May, 2000
Before analysing the political determinants
of recent developments in land reform in
It is thus important to acknowledge that some principles underlying the land reform proposals regarding the following are positive and must be supported:
adoption of a livelihoods approach to development;
having a gradation between subsistence and commercial farmers with a range of products to cater for each;
allowing access to more than one land grant over time;
delinking the food safety net grant from the housing grant, allowing households to access both;
providing some land to a wide range of people in rural areas;
the suggested land use grant as a production support grant for people having acquired land through the food safety net programme.
Macro-economy
The problem is that the macro-economic framework within which these proposals are made will mean a very limited intervention in reality. This conclusion is supported by the following analysis:
Race and class
The food safety net programme represents a
significant aspect of the integrated proposals. One million rural households
are targeted to receive almost 19 million hectares of land over 20 years, with
more than 75% of the overall programme budget being used to achieve this.
However, there doesn't appear to be a vision of a fundamentally transformed
structure of rural social relations at the end of the 20 years. The poor may be
slightly better off, but will still be deeply mired in poverty. A quote from a
Richard Levin article in the mid-1990s (talking about BATAT, but equally
relevant to the "new" proposals) says: "This programme runs the
risk of 'adding on' petty capitalist black farmers to a largely intact core of
white farmers with a monopoly control of agricultural productive and marketing
activities. While black farming in all its forms must be supported, there needs
to be an alternative capable of eroding the monopoly power which white farmers
exert over agriculture." In the proposals, the need to de-racialise
agriculture is raised as a reason for state support to black commercial
farmers. The question needs to be posed, however, as to the value of a
de-racialised agriculture which neither fundamentally alters the class balance
of forces in rural areas nor transforms structures which centralise power and
control in the hands of those who have resources. Structural change is required
in
Integration
Without integrating land reform with the provision of an adequate water supply, access to cheap inputs or with the development of necessary infrastructure to store and distribute surpluses, even commercial farming is likely to be a failure. Integration of land, water and agricultural interventions is required (DLA/DWAF/NDA). In turn, these need to be linked to programmes that allow for the generation of local economies by supporting the local production of inputs for agriculture and non-farm economic activities, and local distribution and retailing networks (DTI). There should be a concerted effort to develop an understanding and practice of local production for local markets. The IDPs should be built into the centre of development efforts, and popular participation in these plans (with consequent accountability) must be strengthened.
Rural development is a product of access to natural resources (land, water and vegetation) plus the availability of economic infrastructure (production, communication, storage and distribution) plus the deployment of Rural Development Officers (trained in participatory, human-centred and integrated approaches to sustainable development) to stimulate and support the development efforts of the people themselves. (In short, raw materials plus technology plus skills). Currently, access to natural resources is severely restricted for the majority of the African rural population, and is likely to be only slightly less so in the forseeable future given the proposed policy framework. Even where it exists, economic infrastructure in rural areas is decaying. Where new infrastructure is being put in, it is often inappropriate and inserted on the basis of narrow economic cost-recovery principles on a community-by-community basis. Instead of training and deploying a cadre of rural development officers armed with an integrated and participatory approach to development, the only technical support provided to rural people is a collapsing agricultural extension service based on apartheid models of development.
The foregoing analysis indicate that, even if taken in good faith, the `new’ shift in land reform policy , like its `predecesor’, is doomed to fail. This is surprising given the fact that it emerged after an assessment of the failures of the previous approach. Having `correctly ‘ noted some of the reasons for its failure, it went on to address different issues. The question is why?
Political determinants of the `new’ shifts
Key political observations are discernible in answering the above question;
Land reform policy in
What has happened, instead, is the refining and sharpening of this confusing contradiction. What the ‘new’ shift signify in reality, is the erasing of the pro-poor rhetoric from the government discourse. This rhetoric - poor of the poor - is seen as sending wrong signnal to the potential investors. Therefore, why not use the language that correctly captures the political intention of the Mbeki administration. Here the correct language is that GEAR is here to stay, and has to be consolidated in every important respects, and it should leave no doubt. Coupled with this shift, is the consolidation of the state apparutus to face up to the potential reaction from the public. Consolidating and expanding the office of the President is the most important move in this regard. A sort of imperial presidency, slowly it removes power and initiative from from the parliament, cabinet, ministers and the departments. All policies have to be screened by this empowered office before going to parliament. The objective is to ensure that all policies and acts are GEAR compliant. Both Labour Tenant’s and Extention of the Security of Tenure Act (ESTA), if were to be re-initiated in their current form, would not pass this imperial dragnet.
Therefore, what is happening is what was initially intended, but due to uncertain configuration of social relations of power in the immediate post apartheid period, it was moral to use a language that reseble pro-poor policies, while in fact is not, hence the confusion and erroneous analysis. Because of the unsustainability of the language rhetoric due to `potential’ foreign direct investors, and white farmers, a need has arisen to remove the gloves. In doing this, some obtacles needed to be neutralised. These included, among other things;
Conclusion
Therefore, the implications of either new or
old policy framework are almost the same, albeit varying in degrees and pace.
What separates them, in practical terms, is a question of language emphasis,
motivated by the analysis of the configuration of the social relation of class
forces. They are both influenced by perceptions of what the political economy
of globalisation expects of